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Modern terrorism is global and decentralized like cyberspace. While the Darknet is
mostly used by terrorists  for fundraising campaigns and illicit  trading, publicly
accessible  social  platforms such as Twitter,  Facebook  or YouTube are  abused for
terrorist  propaganda.  Combating  terrorism  remains  one  of the top  priorities
of the European union (hereinafter as “the EU”). The approach towards the online
content possibly connected to terrorist propaganda has become stricter.
This  paper  focuses  on the development  of the EU  legislation  on the offence
related to terrorist activities: the public provocation to commit a terrorist offence,
as well as on the obligations of hosting service providers. It also analyses the impact
of the Directive  (EU)  2017/541  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
of 15  March  2017  on combating  terrorism  and  replacing  Council  Framework
Decision  2002/475/JHA  and  amending  Council  Decision  2005/671/JHA.
The article  observes  a changing  attitude  on private  monitoring  of online
information  in the development  of the EU  legislation.  It  analyses  changes
in the Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online. These changes signify
a shift  in the perception  of the necessary  level  of freedom  to receive  and  impart
information through the internet.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social media have become an important part of everyday life. About 95 %
of all  information  on the planet  is  digital,  most  of it  is  accessible  via
computer  networks.1 Approximately  3  billion  people  have  accounts
on Facebook, Instagram, Messenger and (or) WhatsApp.2
A general agreement on a universal legal definition of terrorism does not
exist.3 Numerous  international  treaties  and  declarations  use  their  own
definitions.  The Arab  Convention  for  the Suppression  of Terrorism defines
terrorist acts as:
“any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs
in the advancement  of an  individual  or collective  criminal  agenda  and
seeking  to sow  panic  among  people,  causing  fear  by harming  them,
or placing  their  lives,  liberty  or security  in danger,  or seeking  to cause
damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property
or to occupying  or seizing  them,  or seeking  to jeopardise  a national
resource.”4
The Council  of Europe  Convention  on the Prevention  of Terrorism defines
a terrorist offence as “any of the offences within the scope of and as defined in one
of the treaties  listed  in the Appendix” of the aforementioned  convention.5
Regardless of numerous sector specific international treaties and definitions
of terrorism,  the Special  Tribunal  for  Lebanon has  ruled  on the basis
1 Hilbert,  M.  and  López,  P.  (2011)  The World’s  Technological  Capacity  to Store,
Communicate,  and Compute Information.  Science, 332 (6025),  pp. 60–65.  Available  from:
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/332/6025/60 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
2 Facebook.  (2020)  Facebook  Q1  2020  Results.  Investor  Relations. [online]  Available  from:
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2020/q1/Q1-2020-FB-Earnings-
Presentation.pdf [Accessed 16 May 2020].
3 Sanyal,  S.  (2015)  International  Laws  to Control  Terrorism:  A Comparative  Study.
AAKROSH  Asian  Journal  on Terrorism  and  Internal  Conflicts, p. 3.  Available  from:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3232739 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
4 Art. 1(2)  Arab  Convention  for  the Suppression  of Terrorism.  Adopted  by the Council  of Arab
Ministers  of the Interior and the Council  of Arab Ministers  of Justice, 22 April  1998. Available
from: https://www.unodc.org/images/tldb-f/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf [Accessed 16 May
2020].
5 Art. 1(1)  Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 16 May 2005. Available
from: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?
documentId=09000016808c3f55 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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of treaties,  United  Nations resolutions  and  the legislative  and  judicial
practice of States: There is a customary rule of international law regarding
the international  crime  of terrorism  in time  of peace,6 pursuant  to which
terrorism  requires  the following  three  key  elements:  (i)  the intent  (dolus)
of the underlying crime and (ii) the special intent (dolus specialis) to spread
fear or coerce authority; (iii) the commission of a criminal act, and (iv) that
the terrorist act be transnational.7
The EU  is  facing  a range  of terrorists  attacks  both  from  networked
groups  and lone  actors.8 Cyberspace9 enables  terrorists  to find  a suitable
target and to lead an attack almost from anywhere.10 According to Europol,
religiously  motivated  terrorist  groups  use  the internet  and  social  media
to gain instruments of crime and to share information secretly via electronic
services as WhatsApp, Viber or Skype; social platforms as Facebook and Twitter
have been used for propaganda, recruitment or sharing information inside
closed  groups.11 The EU  is  aware  of growing  threat  of terrorism  and
the abuse  of cyberspace,  particularly  the use  of internet  for  propaganda,
recruitment,  effective  communication,  planning  etc.  Combating  terrorism
remains one of the top priorities of the EU.12
According to Europol:
“[a]s the line between online and offline communities becomes increasingly
blurred,  terrorist  propaganda preying on human suffering abroad  reaches
6 Interlocutory  Decision  on the Applicable  Law:  Terrorism,  Conspiracy,  Homicide,  Perpetration,
Cumulative  Charging.  (2011)  STL-11-01/1, Special  Tribunal for  Lebanon, 16 February 2011.
Available  from:  https://www.refworld.org/cases,STL,4d6280162.html [Accessed  16  May
2020].
7 Op. cit., para. 85.
8 EUROPOL. (2019)  The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019. Available
from:  https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-
and-trend-report-2019-te-sat [Accessed 16 May 2020].
9 Virtual environment of interconnected computer devices and networks, i.e. space enabling
sharing  information  and  mutual  communication.  See  Barlow,  J.  P.  (1990)  Crime  and
Puzzlement: in advance of the law on the electronic frontier. Whole Earth Review, pp. 44–57.
10 EUROPOL. (2016)  Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) Revisited. Available from:
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-modus-operandi-of-
islamic-state-revisited  [Accessed  16  May 2019];  United  Nations.  (2019)  New technologies,
artificial intelligence aid fight against global terrorism. [press release] September 4. Available
from: https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1045562 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
11 Op. cit., pp. 4, 11–12; EUROPOL. (2019) Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA),
p. 48. Available from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/iocta-report [Accessed 16 May 2020].
12 European  Council.  (2018)  EU  Counter-Terrorism  Strategy.  Available  from:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/ [Accessed
16 May 2020].
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audiences  in Europe  to unprecedented  extents,  inciting  some  to act  and
driving others to embrace extremist views on the opposite end.”13
Furthermore: 
“IS14 succeeded  in maintaining  an  online  presence  largely  thanks
to unofficial supporter networks and pro-IS media outlets. Pro-IS and pro-
-al-Qaeda  channels  promoted  the use  of alternative  platforms  and  open
source technologies.”15
Terrorist  groups  continue  to exploit  a wide  array  of online  service
providers, including forums, file sharing sites, video streaming and sharing
sites, blogs, messaging and broadcast applications, social media sites etc.16
Social  platform propaganda is  powerful:  the stronger and the more vivid
the online content is, the more it is going to be perceived as likely to occur
in the future, even if not experienced personally.17
Understandably,  the EU  approach  towards  online  content  possibly
connected to terrorist propaganda has become stricter. Claiming to ensure
a smooth  functioning  of the Digital  market,  the European  Commission
(hereinafter  as “the Commission”)  presented  a draft  of a new  regulation
on 12 September 2018: the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and  of the Council  on preventing  the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online18
(hereinafter  as “the proposal  of online  terrorist  content  regulation”
or “the Proposal”),  which  has been introduced at the end of transposition
period  of the Directive  2017/541/EU on combating  terrorism19 (hereinafter
as “the Counter-Terrorism  directive”)  on 8  September  2018.
13 EUROPOL.  (2019)  The European  Union  Terrorism  Situation  and  Trend  Report  2019, p. 5.
Available  from:  https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-
situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat [Accessed 16 May 2020].
14 Islamic State, hereinafter as “IS”.
15 Op. cit., p. 7.
16 EUROPOL. (2019) Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2019, p. 48. Available
from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/iocta-report [Accessed 16 May 2020].
17 Plous, S. (1993)  The Psychology of Judgement and Decision Making. New York: McGraw-Hill,
p. 126.
18 Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on preventing
the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online  (COM/2018/640  final).  Available  from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN [Accessed 16 May
2020].
19 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 15 March 2017
on combating  terrorism  and  replacing  Council  Framework  Decision  2002/475/JHA  and
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.  Official Journal of the European Union. Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861&uri=CELEX:
32017L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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The transposition has not yet been completed in all the EU member states.20
Also, the Commission’s report assessing the extent to which member states
have taken measures to comply with the Counter-Terrorism directive and
the report assessing its added value, were both not submitted yet.21
This  paper  aims  to analyse  the development  of the EU  legislation
regarding  an  offence  related  to terrorist  activities  which  could  be  easily
perpetrated  online:  public  provocation  to commit  a terrorist  offence.
The focus  is  put  on the legislation.  As the danger  consists  of targeting
different audiences, worldwide accessibility and possible influence on wide
international  public  opinion,22 the phenomenon  is  currently  used
in the process  of advocating  new  legislative  endeavours  concerning
the prevention of disseminating terrorist content online.23
The definition  of public  provocation  to commit  a terrorist  offence  has
been  clarified  in the Counter-Terrorism  directive,  which  also  regulates
provisions regarding criminal liability, imposes an obligation to criminalise
aiding and abetting, inciting and attempting, and determines the possibility
for criminal liability of legal persons.24 However, it seems the measures set
up in the Counter-Terrorism directive are not sufficient. Another legislation
that  shall  be  directly  applicable  in all  the EU  member  states  has  been
proposed.  Therefore,  following  questions  arise:  what  is  the Counter-
-Terrorism  directive’s  legal  regulation  of public  provocation  to commit
a terrorist  offence? What changes are suggested by the proposal  of online
terrorist content regulation and why? What do these changes signify?
20 Greece,  Cyprus  and  Luxembourg  did  not  comply  with  the transposition  before
the deadline.  See  National  transposition  measures  communicated  by the Member  States
concerning:  Directive  (EU) 2017/541  of the European Parliament  and of the Council  of 15
March  2017  on combating  terrorism  and  replacing  Council  Framework  Decision
2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. Available from: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32017L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
21 According  to Art. 29  of the Counter-Terrorism  directive,  reports  shall  be  given
to the European Parliament and to the Council by 8 March 2020 and 8 September 2021.
22 Broadhurst, R. et al. (2017) Cyber terrorism: research report of the Australian National University
Cybercrime  Observatory  for  the  Korean  Institute  of Criminology, p. 67.  Available  from:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984101 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2984101
[Accessed 16 May 2020].
23 Proposal  for  a regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on preventing
the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online (COM/2018/640  final).  Available  from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN [Accessed 16 May
2020].
24 Art. 5, 13–14, 17–18 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 15  March  2017  on combating  terrorism  and  replacing  Council  Framework  Decision
2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. Official Journal of the European
Union. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861
&uri=CELEX:32017L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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A short  insight  to the development  of legislation  on terrorism  and
terrorist offences in the EU and an analysis of the term “public provocation
to commit  a terrorist  offence”  are  presented.  The wording  of the Council
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism,
amended  by the Decision  2008/919/JHA  (hereinafter  as “Framework
Decision  2008”)25 is  compared  with  the Counter-Terrorism  directive.
The objectives  of the legislation  are  emphasized  and  problematic  parts
in the Counter-Terrorism  directive’s  interpretation  are  pointed  out.
The definition  of public  provocation  to commit  a terrorist  offence  is
compared  with  the terrorist  content  definition  presented  in the proposal
of online terrorist content regulation.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATION AND 
HARMONISATION OF TERRORIST OFFENCES IN THE EU
The EU started harmonising definitions of terrorist offences in the member
states’  legislation  after  terrorist  attacks  on the World  Trade  Centre
on 11 September  2001.  Along  with  the Council  Common  Position
of 27 December  2001  on the application  of specific  measures  to combat
terrorism, definitions of eleven terrorist acts were adopted.26 Until recently
the cornerstone  of criminal  response  to counter  terrorism  had  been
the Framework  Decision  200827 which  has  defined  a “public  provocation
to commit a terrorist offence” for the first time as:
“the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public,
with  the intent  to incite  the commission  of one  of the offences  listed
in Article  1(1)(a)  to (h),  where  such  conduct,  whether  or not  directly
25 Council  Framework  Decision  of 13  June  2002  on combating  terrorism  and  Council
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism.  Official  Journal  of the European Union.  Consolidated
version  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:
02002F0475-20081209 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
26 According  to Art. 3  of the Council  Common  Position  of 27  December  2001
on the application  of specific  measures  to combat  terrorism,  for  an  act  to be  considered
a terrorist  act,  there  have  to be  (1)  intention,  (2)  serious  damage  for  a country
or an international organisation, (3) being the offence under national law, and (4) presence
of at least one of three particularly stipulated motives.
27 Council  Framework  Decision  of 13  June  2002  on combating  terrorism  and  Council
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism.  Official  Journal  of the European Union.  Consolidated
version  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:
02002F0475-20081209 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences
may be committed.”28
After  the adoption  of the Framework  Decision  2008,  most  of the EU
member  states  introduced  measures  criminalising  public  provocation
to commit  a terrorist  offence.  According  to the Commission’s  report  from
2014, less than half of the EU member states had adopted specific provisions
explicitly criminalising the dissemination of messages to the public:
“with  a view  to inciting  terrorist  offences,  closely  aligned  to the wording
of the Framework Decision 2008”.
However,  many  of the member  states  remained  on a general  level,
i.e. criminalising  incitement,  provocation,  facilitation  and  support
of terrorist offences.29 Different terms used in national legislations left some
room  for  interpretation.  According  to the Commission,  relying  on more
general  terms,  instead  of relying  on the mere  intent  to incite  terrorist
offences,  might  lead  to the risk  that  only  “direct provocation” not  also
“indirect  provocation” would  be  criminalised.30 Regarding  the incitement
to terrorism,  national  courts  have  opposed  broad  definitions  in favour
of narrow  interpretation  in order  to avoid  restricting  the freedom
of expression  and  comply  with  the Article  10  of the European  Convention
on Human  Rights.31 The Framework  Decision  2008  did  not  satisfactorily
answer questions on where the free speech ends and the incitement begins.
Demands  on defining limits  between  public  provocation  to commit
a terrorist offence and the freedom of speech in a clearer way persisted and
28 Op. cit., Art. 3 (1) (a).
29 European Commission. (2008) The Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November
2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, p. 5. Available from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52014DC0554 [Accessed 16 May
2020].
30 In 2014 the provisions were explicitly limited to the direct provocation in Belgium, France
and Estonia. A risk of not criminalising the indirect provocation existed in Italy, Hungary,
Malta and Lithuania. See op. cit., p. 6.
31 In 2007,  when  ruling  in the case  of a Basque  punk  band  accused  for  a song  referencing
the Guardía  Civil  as the targets  of ETA,  a Basque  separatist  organisation,  the Spanish
Supreme Court ruled that a narrow interpretation of the incitement provision in Spanish
criminal code is  needed in order to comply with the Article  10 of the ECHR.  Rediker,  E.
(2015)  The Incitement  of Terrorism  on the Internet:  Legal  Standards,  Enforcement,  and
the Role  of the European Union.  Michigan Journal  of International  Law, 36 (2),  pp. 338–342.
Available from: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol36/iss2/3/ [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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proposals  to replace  old  framework  decisions  with  a new  directive
appeared.32
On 12 December  2015  the Commission  proposed  a draft  of the new
Counter-Terrorism  directive.  The draft  aimed  not  only  to adapt  the EU
legislation  to the dissemination  of messages,  images  and  other  material
related  to terrorism  online,  but  also  to clarify  what  shall  be  considered
as terrorist  offences  in the EU.  On 15 March  2017  the EU  adopted
the Counter-Terrorism  directive  in order  to harmonise  legislation
on fighting  terrorism  and  to adapt  legal  norms  to specific  transnational
nature. The Counter-Terrorism directive replaced the Framework Decision
2008  and  amended  parts  of the Decision  2005/671/JHA  on sharing
information and on the cooperation concerning terrorist offences. Regarding
online  social  media,  the Counter-Terrorism  directive  aims  particularly
to address  online  propaganda,33 recruitment34,  and  other  auxiliary
behaviour35,  all  of which increase  the risk that  terrorist  offence  would be
committed.36
3. OFFENCES WITHIN THE GENERAL CONCEPT 
OF TERRORISM 
The Counter-Terrorism  directive’s  strength  consists  in approximation
of definitions of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group, and
offences  related to terrorist  activities  in all  the EU member states.37 Legal
provisions  of fight  to counter  terrorism  have  been  strengthened
by criminalisation of behaviour that  is  a preparatory phase of crime,  such
32 Ibid.
33 Art. 5–6 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.  Official Journal of the European Union. Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861&uri=CELEX:320
17L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
34 Op. cit., Art. 6.
35 Op. cit., Art. 7–12.
36 Shamieh,  L.  and  Szenes,  Z.  (2015)  The Propaganda  of ISIS/DAESH  through  the Virtual
Space.  Defence  Against  Terrorism  Revue, 7 (1),  p. 9.  Available  from:  http://www.coedat.
nato.int/publication/datr/volumes/datr10.pdf  [Accessed 16 May 2020].  For simplified and
unified  model  of radicalisation  process  see  Hunter,  R.  and  Heinke,  D.  H.  (2011)
Radicalization  of Islamist  Terrorists  in the Western  World.  FBI  Law  Enforcement  Bulletin,
9 (80),  pp. 25–31.  Available  from:  https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/perspective/perspective-
radicalization-of-islamist-terrorists-in-the-western-world [Accessed 16 May 2020].
37 With an exception of United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. Rec. 41–42 of the Counter-
-Terrorism directive.
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as recruitment (Art. 6), providing training for terrorism (Art. 8) or travelling
for the purpose of terrorism (Art. 9).
The Counter-Terrorism  directive  recognises  three  groups  of offences:
(i) terrorist  offences,  (ii) offences  related  to a terrorist  group  and
(iii) offences  related  to terrorist  activities.  The list  of terrorist  offences  is
exhaustive  and  encompasses  only  intentional  acts  explicitly  mentioned
in Art. 3,  defined  as offences  under  national  law and,  given  their  nature
or context,  being  able  to seriously  damage  a country  or an international
organisation,  and  in the case  they  were  committed  with  the terrorist
intention.38 The notion of terrorist intention must apply to all the elements
of crime.  Outside  these  conditions  a misuse  of information  and
communications  technology  (hereinafter  as “ICT”)  for  propaganda,
recruitment  or dissemination  of training  instructions  with  the intent
to commit or to contribute to the commission of any terrorist offence could
be considered as offence  related to terrorist  activities.  The offences  linked
to terrorist  activities  fall  within  the scope  of the general  concept
of terrorism.39
3.1. PUBLIC PROVOCATION TO COMMIT A TERRORIST OFFENCE
Among  offences  related  to terrorist  activities  a particular  interest  is  put
on the offence  of public  provocation  to commit  a terrorist  offence,  which
shall  comprise  glorification  or justification  of terrorism  or dissemination
of messages  or images  in order  to gain  support  for  terrorist  purposes.40
Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence is defined as: 
“the distribution,  or otherwise  making  available  by any  means,  whether
online  or offline,  of a message  to the public,  with  the intent  to incite
the commission of one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(1),
where  such  conduct,  directly  or indirectly,  such  as by the glorification
of terrorist  acts,  advocates  the commission  of terrorist  offences,  thereby
38 Art. 3 (2)  Directive  (EU)  2017/541  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
of 15 March  2017  on combating  terrorism  and  replacing  Council  Framework  Decision
2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. Official Journal of the European
Union. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861
&uri=CELEX:32017L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
39 Judgement of 31 January 2017, Lounani, C-573/14, ECLI:EU:C:2017:71, para. 50–51.
40 Rec. 10 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.  Official Journal of the European Union.  Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861&uri=CELEX:320
17L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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causing  a danger  that  one  or more  such  offences  may  be  committed,  is
punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.”41
The EU member states shall criminalise not only aiding and abetting but
also  inciting  the offence.42 In comparison  to the Framework Decision  2008
the criminalisation  of involvement in public  provocation  to commit
a terrorist offence has been extended to inciting.43
It  is  apparent  that  the definition  is  broader  than  the previous  one
in the Framework  Decision  2008.  The Counter-Terrorism  directive’s
definition emphasizes that the distribution (or otherwise making available)
of the message  to the public  may  occur  by any  means,  either  online
or offline.  Also,  it  stipulates  expressly  that  it  is  not  important  if such
distribution  advocates  the commission  of listed  terrorist  offences  directly
or indirectly,  because  the Commission  was  afraid  that  the indirect
provocation  would  not  be  criminalised  in all  member  states.44 Another
extension  of the definition  presents  the list  of terrorist  offences  intended
to be  incited  by the provocation.  Art. 3 (1) i)  of the Counter-Terrorism
directive provides for a new terrorist offence of illegal system interference;45
a disposure  of radiological  weapons  and  development  of radiological
or nuclear weapons are added to the definition of terrorist offence.46
The further change concerns a fault which is presented in the definition
of the offence itself.  The Counter-Terrorism directive’s  definition of public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence has emphasized the intent (“… is
punishable  as a criminal  offence  when  committed  intentionally”),47 whether
41 Op. cit., Art. 5.
42 Op. cit., Art. 14 (1) (2).
43 Art. 4 (2) Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism and Council
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism.  Official  Journal  of the European Union.  Consolidated
version  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:
02002F0475-20081209  [Accessed  16  May  2020];  Art.  14  (2)  Directive  (EU)  2017/541
of the European Parliament  and of the Council  of 15  March 2017 on combating terrorism
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision
2005/671/JHA.  Official Journal of the European Union. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861&uri=CELEX:32017L0541  [Accessed  16  May
2020].
44 See Chapter 1.
45 Art. 3 (1) i)  Directive  (EU)  2017/541  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
of 15 March  2017  on combating  terrorism  and  replacing  Council  Framework  Decision
2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. Official Journal of the European
Union. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861
&uri=CELEX:32017L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
46 Op. cit., Art. 3 (1) f).
47 Op. cit., Art. 5.
2020] K. Ramešová: Public Provocation to Commit a Terrorist Offence ... 133
the Framework  Decision  2008  mentioned  the intent  in another  provision,
when  demanding  criminalisation  of expressly  stipulated  intentional acts,
such as public provocation to commit a terrorist  offence.48 In the definition
of public  provocation  to commit  a terrorist  offence  itself,  the Framework
Decision  2008  mentioned  the intent  only  when  stipulating  “the intent
to incite  the commission  of one  of the offences  listed  in Article  1(1)(a)  to (h).”49
Nevertheless,  the interpretation  of fault  should  stay  the same
as in the Framework  Decision  2008:  the Framework  Decision  2008  has
stipulated that the distribution or otherwise making available of a message
to the public, has to be perpetrated with the intent to incite the commission
of one of the listed offences.50 Such distribution could be hardly committed
in negligence, i.e. with no intent, as a perpetrator necessarily had to act with
the particular intent to incite the commission of at least one of the offences
listed in Article 1(1)(a) to (h) of the Framework Decision 2008.51
Regarding the body of crime, the Counter-Terrorism directive evidently
does  not  distinguish  between  online  and  offline  environment.  For
the criminal  liability  it  is  not  important.  Nevertheless,  it  underlines  that
such conduct should be punishable when it causes a danger that terrorists
acts  may  be  committed;  such  danger  should  be  considered  regarding
the addressee of the message.52 As the online illegal content spreads easily
and  reaches  disproportionately  more  audiences  (addressees)  as possible,
committing  crime  online  may  be  considered  as an aggravating
circumstance. On the other hand, a particularly injurious effect of the crime
committed  online  is  disputable,  as the actual  effect  of online  propaganda
in individual  radicalisation  of a perpetrator  is  not  so clear.  According
to Heinke,  even  though an  ideological  framing  may  happen  individually
through the internet, yet in most cases social contacts with peers are more
important;  radicalisation  does  not  often  happen  only  after  observing
48 Art. 3 (2) a)  Council  Framework  Decision  of 13  June  2002  on combating  terrorism  and
Council  Framework  Decision  2008/919/JHA of 28 November  2008  amending  Framework
Decision  2002/475/JHA  on combating  terrorism.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union.
Consolidated  version  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri=CELEX:02002F0475-20081209 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
49 Op. cit., Art. 3 (1) a).
50 Op. cit., Art. 3 (1).
51 Ibid.
52 Rec. 10 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.  Official Journal of the European Union. Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861&uri=CELEX:320
17L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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a terrorist  propaganda  video  or reading  online  radicalising  message  but
through  closer  social  relationships  in a radicalised  community  of peers.53
Consequently, the effect of any particular offence should be addressed and
evaluated in each individual case.
Further  amendment  to the previous  definition  of public  provocation
to commit  a terrorist  offence  set  by the Framework  Decision  2008,  is
the causality  between  a distribution  of the message  to the public  and
the danger  that  any  terrorist  offence  may  be  committed:  it  is  explicitly
stated that the indirect provocation is sufficient. The aim was to harmonise
national legislation so that the indirect provocation would be criminalised
in all  the EU  member  states  without  an  exception.54 Nevertheless,
the interpretation of indirect provocation by national courts may still vary;
a preliminary  question  to the Court  of Justice  of the EU  has  not  yet  been
asked.  The danger  that  a terrorist  offence  would  be  actually  committed,
should  be  judged  according  to specific  circumstances  of the case,  such
as who  the author  and  the addressee  of the message  were  and  in which
context the act is committed.55
The Counter-Terrorism  directive  particularly  proclaims  that  any  of its
provisions  cannot  be  interpreted  as the reduction  or restriction
to the dissemination  of information  for  scientific,  academic  or reporting
purposes; furthermore:
“the expression  of radical,  polemic  or controversial  views  in the public
debate on sensitive political questions, falls outside the scope of this directive
and, in particular, of the definition of public provocation to commit terrorist
offences.”56
53 Heinke,  D.  H.  (2016) Countering  Radicalisation  and  Recruitment  of so-called  Jihadists –
Proscription of Radicalization Hubs. Defence Against Terrorism Revue, 8, p. 92.
54 The Report  from  the Commission  to the European  Parliament  and  the Council
on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008
amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (COM/2014/554 final)
Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/
documents/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/general/docs/report_on_the_implementation_of_cf
d_2008-919-jha_and_cfd_2002-475-jha_on_combating_terrorism_en.pdf [Accessed 4 June
2020].
55 Rec. 10 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.  Official Journal of the European Union. Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861&uri=CELEX:
32017L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
56 Op. cit., Rec. 10 and 40.
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Interestingly,  the wording  of the proposal  of online  terrorist  content
regulation is not so strict, stipulating:
“the expression  of radical,  polemic  or controversial  views  in the public
debate  on sensitive  political  questions  should  not  be  considered  terrorist
content.“57
The scope of freedom of speech, when it comes to terrorist propaganda,
remains blurred due to many indefinite legal terms used, which might be
problematic  regarding  principles  of foreseeability  and  unambiguity
of criminal  law.  These  principles  are  meant  to secure  that  a person  has
to know whether she would commit a crime by particular act.58
3.2. COUNTER-TERRORISM DIRECTIVE AND HOSTING SERVICE
PROVIDERS’ OBLIGATIONS 
Legal  persons  may  be  held  criminally  liable  for  public  provocation
to commit  a terrorist  offence  under  the conditions  of Art. 17 (1) (2)
of the Counter-Terrorism directive. The provision is particularly important
to hosting  service  providers  (hereinafter  as “HSP”)  as they  enable
uploading third party content.  It  is  strictly  stipulated that  a legal  person
may be held liable in the situation where the lack of supervision or control
by a person  in the particular  leading  position  has  made  possible
the commission  of public  provocation  to commit  a terrorist  offence,  for
the benefit of the legal person by a person under its authority.
The obligation to remove or to block online terrorist content is imposed
as a preventive  measure59 and  is  presumed  to be  adopted  promptly,
57 Rec. 9  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final). Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN  [Accessed
16 May 2020].
58 For the complexities of the right to the free speech on the internet in different jurisdictions,
see Lessig, L. and Resnick, P. (1999) Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical
Model.  Michigan  Law  Review,  p. 395–396.  Available  from:  https://cyber.harvard.edu/wg_
home/uploads/200/1999-06.pdf [Accessed 16 May 2020];  Barnhizer  for  example describes
the U.S.  approach to the limitations  on free  speech  with  the phrase  “sticks  and  stones  can
break  the bones  but  words  can  never  hurt”,  in comparison  to the European  world  in which
“the beliefs  of many ethnic  and  religious  groups  are  closely  related  to pride,  honor  and  shame.”
Barnhizer,  D.  R.  (2007)  Reverse  Colonization:  Islam,  Honor  Cultures  and  the Confrontation
between  Divine  and  Quasi-Secular  Natural  Law. Cleveland-Marshall  Legal  Studies  Paper
No. 07-142, p. 5. Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=980687 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
59 Art. 21 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.  Official Journal of the European Union. Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549825019861&uri=CELEX:
32017L0541 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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i.e. without  any  link  to criminal  or other  proceedings.  It  is  expressly
stipulated  that  no  general  obligation  to monitor  transmitted  or stored
information  nor  to actively  seek  out  the facts  or circumstances  indicating
illegal  activity  should  be  imposed  on service  providers.  The actual
knowledge of illegal activity and awareness of the facts is still essential for
their  liability.60 Although  no  obligation  regarding  private  monitoring  is
imposed,  the endeavours  are  welcomed.  The Counter-Terrorism  directive
presumes either public or judicial action, enhancing particularly voluntary
action of the Internet industry,61 such as forming the Global Internet forum
to Counter  Terrorism  by Facebook,  Microsoft,  Twitter  and  YouTube  in July
201762 or the cooperation of Facebook,  Twitter,  Google  and  Microsoft  in using
the software  PhotoDNA to detect extremist  online  content,  such as violent
terrorist  imagery  or recruitment  videos.63 The cooperation  is  based
on sharing an industry database of “hashes”, i.e. unique digital fingerprints
for violent terrorist imagery or videos that have been removed from their
services.  Only the most extreme content is shared in the database, the one
most likely to violate all of the respective companies’ content policies.64
Even  though  the number  of HSP  who  have  put  in place  measures
dealing with terrorist content on their services rises, the Commission does
not  consider  voluntary  frameworks  and  partnerships  sufficient  enough,
as not  all  affected  HSP engaged  in the voluntary  cooperation.65 To speed
up the procedures  dealing  with  terrorist  content  on the services
of information  society  service  providers  in the EU,  a new  regulation
on preventing  the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online  has  been
proposed.
60 Op. cit., Rec. 23.
61 Op. cit., Rec. 22. 
62 GIFCT. Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism: Evolving an Institution. [online] Available
from: https://gifct.org/about/ [Accessed 16 May 2020].
63 Facebook.  (2016)  Partnering  to Help Curb Spread of Online  Terrorist  Content.  [press release]
5 December.  Available  from:  https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/partnering-to-help-
curb-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/ [Accessed 16 May 2020].
64 Ibid.
65 Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on preventing
the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online (COM/2018/640  final),  p. 1.  Available  from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN [Accessed 16 May
2020].
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4. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW REGULATION ON PREVENTING
THE DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST CONTENT ONLINE
Legal  basis  for  the new  regulation  should  be  Art. 114  of the Treaty
on the functioning  of the EU  providing  for  the adoption  of measures
approximating  the establishment  and functioning  of the internal  market.66
Although  the proposed provisions  are  primarily  focused  to tackle  online
terrorist propaganda, the Commission itself repeats the motive to intervene
against  the dissemination  of terrorist  content.  Chosen  legal  basis  and
alleged obstacles  for  economic  activity in the EU as the main goal  of new
regulation  are  rather  questionable.  The first  paragraph of the explanatory
memorandum itself refers to the terrorist attacks and the misuse of internet
by terrorists aiming to glorify their atrocities.67 Nevertheless,  a proclaimed
goal of the legislation is:
“to guarantee  the smooth functioning of the Digital  Single Market,  whilst
ensuring trust and security.”68
By setting  a minimum  set  of obligations  for  the HSP  directing  their
services  to the EU,  the Commission  believes  in preventing  the misuse
of internet  for  terrorist  purposes,  improving  accountability  and
transparency of HSP offering services in the EU, and clarifying their liability
rules.69 New regulation should lead to detection and removal or blocking
of online  terrorist  content  by the HSP  offering  services  in the EU
irrespective  of their  place  of main  establishment.70 However,  the scope
of applicability is  narrowed by a definition of “to offer services  in the EU”
and by demanding either an establishment in the EU, a significant number
of users, or targeting the activities to at least one member state.71
Liability  benefit  in Art. 14  of the E-commerce  directive72 stipulating
specific  conditions  under  which  HSP  are  not  liable  for  the stored
66 Op. cit., p. 4.
67 Op. cit., p. 1.
68 Op. cit., p. 3.
69 Op.  cit., p. 2.  See  also  Art.  1  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European Parliament  and
of the Council  on preventing the dissemination of terrorist  content online  (COM/2018/640
final). Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:
FIN [Accessed 16 May 2020].
70 Art. 1 (2)  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final). Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN  [Accessed
16 May 2020].
71 Op. cit., Art. 2 (3).
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information,  should not  be  affected  by any pro-active  measures  adopted
on the basis  of the regulation.73 However,  Art. 15 (1)  of the E-commerce
directive  expressly  specifies  that  no  general  obligation  to monitor
the transmitted  or stored  information,  nor  to actively  seek  facts
or circumstances  indicating  illegal  activity  shall  be  imposed  on HSP.
The prohibition  of general  monitoring  in the E-commerce  directive
compared with the proactive monitoring for terrorist content online shows
a clear change of perception on the necessary level of virtual freedom. Even
though  Rec. 19  of the Proposal  proclaims  that  any  proportionate  and
specific  proactive  measures  should  not  present  a general  obligation
to monitor,74 it  is  also  mentioned  that  grave  risks  of terrorist  content
dissemination  may justify  a derogation  from this  principle  under  the EU
framework  and  the HSP  shall  take  proactive  measures  against
the dissemination  of terrorist  content.75 The negotiating  position
of the Council  of the EU  adopted  on 6  December  2018  which  agreed
on the proposed  rules,  is  also  signaling  the shift  in the attitude  towards
monitoring illegal and harmful online content.76
On the other  hand,  the European  Parliament (hereinafter  as “EP”)
in the legislative  resolution  of 17th April  2019  on the Proposal,  adopted
many amendments aiming to emphasize the freedom to receive and impart
information and ideas  in an open and democratic  society,  the rule of law
and  the perception  of terrorist  content  as a part  of a broader  problem
of illegal  content  online,  and  the general  obligation  for  HSP  to monitor
72 Art. 14 of the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000  on certain  legal  aspects  of information  society  services,  in particular  electronic
commerce,  in the Internal  Market.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union.  Available  from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1549827901048&uri=CELEX:32000L
0031 [Accessed 16 May 2020]. (hereinafter as “E-commerce directive”)
73 Rec. 5  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final). Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN  [Accessed
16 May 2020].
74 Op. cit., Rec. 19.
75 Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on preventing
the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final), pp. 3–5. Available from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN [Accessed 16 May
2020].
76 Council of the EU. (2018)  Terrorist Content Online: Council adopts negotiating position on new
rules  to prevent  dissemination.  [press  release]  6  December.  Available  from:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/06/terrorist-content-
online-council-adopts-negotiating-position-on-new-rules-to-prevent-dissemination/
[Accessed 16 May 2020].
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stored  information  or to actively  seek  facts  indicating  illegal  activity  has
been refused.77
Although  the Proposal  introduces  a completely  new  definition
of terrorist  content on the basis of the Counter-Terrorism directive,  it  does
not  have an impact  on definitions  of terrorist  offences  set  in the Counter-
-Terrorism  directive.  Under  Art. 2 (5)  terrorist  content  should  mean
following information: 
a)  inciting  or advocating,  including  by glorifying,  the commission
of terrorist offences, thereby causing a danger that such acts be committed;
b) encouraging the contribution to terrorist offences;
c) promoting the activities of a terrorist group, in particular by encouraging
the participation  in or support  to a terrorist  group  within  the meaning
of Art. 2(3) of the directive on combating terrorism or
d)  instructing  on methods  or techniques  for  the purpose  of committing
terrorist offences.78 
According  to Art. 5  of the Counter-Terrorism  directive  the essence
of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence is the message intending
to incite commission of terrorist offence. The Proposal introduces a broader
definition of terrorist content, which comprises inciting and advocating, but
also promoting and instructing on the activities related to terrorist offences.
Such definition enables to remove (or block access to) a wider set of online
content particularly through the indefinite “activities” of a terrorist group.
The EP’s  amendments  have  narrowed  the definition  with  the link
to the terrorist  offences  in the Counter-Terrorism  directive  and  the notion
77 Compare the Amendments 2–4, 6, 10, 12, 15, 21, 27, 43, 45, 46, 61, 62, 85, 86, 87, 88, 100, 103,
104,  106,  107,  110,  147  adopted  by the EP.  European  Parliament  legislative  resolution
of 17 April  2019  on the proposal  for  a regulation  of the European  Parliament  and
of the Council  on preventing  the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online (COM(2018)
0640 –  C8-0405/2018 –  2018/0331(COD)).  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/CS/TXT/?uri=EP:P8_TA(2019)0421 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
78 Art. 2(5)  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final). Available
from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN  [Accessed
16 May 2020].
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of intent,79 but  did  not  clarify  the activities  of a terrorist  group  under
Art. 2(5) c) of the Proposal.80
Assessment  of whether  an  information  is  or is  not  a terrorist  content
shall be done both by public authorities and HSP. Some rules are offered,
but  the guidance  is  only  general.81 Overbroad  definitions  are  criticised
as the text  introduces  risks  of arbitrariness  in the removal  of online
content.82 Even  though  the Proposal  enhances  adoption  of proactive
measures  regarding  the monitoring  of online  content  by HSP  to prevent
dissemination of terrorist content, the distinction of free speech and illegal
terrorist content is not improved, while fundamental conditions could have
been stipulated in terms and conditions of each HSP.83 The EP has deleted
the latter provision that could be perceived as a step towards fragmentation
of the freedom to receive and share information online.84
HSP should apply measures to prevent dissemination of terrorist content
and to determine what appropriate,  proportionate and effective proactive
measure  should  be  put  in place,  while  in the same  time  they  are  not
encouraged  to perform  general  monitoring.85 Empowering  other  bodies
than  judicial  to decide  on the implemented  measures  has  been  criticised
by the Committee on Internal Market  and Consumer Protection of the European
79 Amendment  53,  54.  European  Parliament  legislative  resolution  of 17  April  2019
on the proposal  for  a regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing  the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online (COM(2018)0640 –  C8-0405/
2018 –  2018/0331(COD)).  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/CS/TXT/?
uri=EP:P8_TA(2019)0421 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
80 Op. cit., Amendment 55.
81 Rec. 9  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final). Available
from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN 
[Accessed 16 May 2020].
82 EDRI.  (2018)  The EU  Council’s  general  approach on Terrorist  Content  Online  proposal:  A step
towards  pre-emptive  censorship.  [press  release]  11  December.  Available  from:
https://edri.org/the-eu-councils-general-approach-on-terrorist-content-online-proposal-a-
step-towards-pre-emptive-censorship/ [Accessed 16 May 2020].
83 See  Art.  3  (2)  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final). Available
from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN 
[Accessed 16 May 2020].
84 Amendment 63 European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 April 2019 on the proposal
for  a regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on preventing
the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online (COM(2018)0640 –  C8-0405/2018 –  2018/0331
(COD)).  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/CS/TXT/?uri=EP:P8_TA
(2019)0421 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
85 Rec. 16  Proposal  for  a Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final). Available
from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN 
[Accessed 16 May 2020].
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Parliament (hereinafter  as “IMCO”).86 The IMCO  has  made  amendments
to Rec. 37 of the Proposal so that administrative authorities may only issue
removal  orders  on the basis  of a court  decision,  but  may  not  impose
penalties.87 A provision  regarding  a “competent  authority”  which  shall
mean only  “a designated national judicial  authority in the Member State”,  has
been  added.88 The changes  signalised  distrust  in the arrangement  where
non-judicial  (public  or private)  authorities  would  gain  broad  powers
in the online  content  supervision  system.  Consequently,  the EP  has
amended Rec. 37 and proposed, that the competent authority shall be: 
“a single  designated  judicial  authority  or functionally  independent
administrative authority in the Member State.”89
Another  obligation  of HSP  is  to comply  with  legal  order  requesting
to remove  or to disable  access  to terrorist  content  within  one  hour  from
receiving  the order  from  competent  authority.90 Considerable  financial
penalties for the HSP who would fail to do so are suggested.91 The one-hour
limit for the removal was regarded as too short and unrealistic.92 Therefore,
the EP has obliged the HSP to remove terrorist content or disable access to it
“as soon as possible”, but as the rule “within one hour from receipt of the removal
order”  has  stayed,93 the obligation  is  even  stricter.  Choice  of competent
authority with the power to issue a removal order is on the member states;
86 Draft  Opinion  of the Committee  on the Internal  Market  and  Consumer  Protection  for
the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist
content  online (2018/0331  (COD)).  Available  from:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-632.028+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&
language=EN [Accessed 16 May 2020].
87 Op. cit., Amendment 30.
88 Op. cit., Amendments 48, 88.
89 Amendment 60 European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 April 2019 on the proposal
for  a regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on preventing
the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online (COM(2018)0640 –  C8-0405/2018 –  2018/0331
(COD)).  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/CS/TXT/?uri=EP:P8_TA
(2019)0421 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
90 Art. 4 (2)  Proposal  for  a regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM/2018/640 final). Available
from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN 
[Accessed 16 May 2020].
91 Op. cit., Art. 18 (4).
92 Draft  Opinion  of the Committee  on the Internal  Market  and  Consumer  Protection  for
the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist
content  online (2018/0331  (COD)).  Available  from:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
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it could be single designated judicial authority or functionally independent
administrative authority.94 Possibility to have removal orders issued from
other than judicial authorities might be problematic as the removal orders
can  intervene  with  the right  to share  and  receive  information.  Possible
variant  would  be  to have  the public  authority  issue  a removal  order
in preliminary proceedings. Interim and precautionary measures are typical
in civil  and criminal  court  proceedings  throughout  the EU95 and may be
imposed  on a defendant  or an  accused  person  by a court  before  the final
judgement  on the merits  is  rendered.  As the removal  orders  according
to Art. 4 (2) of the Proposal will definitely interfere with the right to the free
speech  and  freedom  to share  and  receive  information,  the competent
authority with the power to issue them should be the court.  On the other
hand, courts are not specialised in particular agenda as the administrative
bodies are, and court proceedings may be lengthier. A fast reaction needed
to block or remove online terrorist content effectively could be jeopardized.
5. CONCLUSION
Manifestations  of terrorists’  beliefs  and  activities  are  visible  online
as terrorists  use  online  social  media  platforms to magnify  impact  of their
acts  or to promote  their  crimes  publicly.  Even  though  social  contact  is
deemed  more  important  for  individual  radicalisation,  online  terrorist
propaganda  plays  a particular  role.  The HSP  offering  their  services
in the EU are encouraged to identify terrorist online content and to remove
it immediately from all their respective services and platforms. Many HSP
started  to participate  in voluntary  frameworks  and  partnerships  to share
information and cooperate.
While  the Counter-Terrorism  directive  focuses  on harmonisation
of terrorist offences’ definitions and obliges the EU member states to ensure
prompt  removal  of such  online  terrorist  content,  the proposal  of online
terrorist  content  regulation  clearly  imposes  the obligations  to prevent
dissemination of terrorist  content online,  including the choice of proactive
93 Amendment 69 European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 April 2019 on the proposal
for  a regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on preventing
the dissemination  of terrorist  content  online (COM(2018)0640 –  C8-0405/2018 –  2018/0331
(COD)).  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/CS/TXT/?uri=EP:P8_TA
(2019)0421 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
94 Op. cit., Amendment 60.
95 European  Union.  (2019)  Interim  and  precautionary  measures.  European  e-justice. [online]
Available  from:  https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_interim_and_precautionary_measures-
78-en.do?init=true [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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measures,  on HSP.  Risks  that  the measures  might  unlawfully  restrict
the right  to information  have  been  described.  The demands  to define
the limits  between  public  provocation  to commit  a terrorist  offence  and
the freedom  of speech  persist.  The burden  of assessment  whether  online
information does or does not  constitute a terrorist  content will  be shifted
more on HSP who will  become the actual  jurors of legality.  Even though
this  approach  is  understandable  due  to the immense  amount  of online
information and the abuse of social platforms for terrorist propaganda and
recruitment,  risks  for  freedom  to receive  and  impart  information  is
apparent.  There  is  a clear  change  of perception  on the necessary  level
of online control and monitoring in the EU.
The approach  of prioritizing  security  before  liberties  of digital  society
has led the Commission to present the proposal of online terrorist  content
regulation.  Generally  approving  attitude  of the Council  on preventive
regulation of the internet regarding online terrorist content and the changes
in secondary  legislation  reflect  considerable  shift  in the perception
of individuals’  freedoms  in online  environment.  The EP’s  amendments,
on the other  hand,  emphasized  the liberties  of online  environment.
Remedies  ensuring due review of removal and blocking of alleged illegal
online  content  must  be  secured.  HSP  should  be  encouraged  to remove
terrorist  content  online  and  to cooperate  with  member  states’  law
enforcement  agencies  and  Europol.  Nevertheless,  implemented  measures
should  be  decided  by the public  authorities  in the proceedings  with
a possibility of judicial review.
Balancing  between  liberty  and  security  is  persistent  in the political
environment since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.96 In adopting
specific  counter-measures  against  the risk  of terrorism,  the analysis
performed  by decision  makers  is  likely  to be  tilted  towards  the interest
on security  than  the one  on liberty.97 The terrorist  attacks  experienced
during recent years have accelerated and influenced the legislative process
in the EU significantly  and might  be leading to undervaluation of liberty,
particularly the right to receive and impart information as a basic principle
of information society.
96 Waldron,  J.  (2011)  Safety  and  Security.  Nebraska  Law  Review,  85.  Available  from:
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol85/iss2/5/ [Accessed 16 May 2020].
97 Gross,  O.  (2018)  Security  vs. Liberty:  An  Imbalanced  Balancing.  Minnesota  Legal  Studies
Research Paper No. 09-42, pp. 2–3. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1471634 [Accessed 16 May 2020].
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